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ABSTRACT 
The paper "Lance Armstrong, It wasn't just about the bike", examines the Lance Armstrong 
saga from a comparative perspective, examining what might happen if such a high profile 
saga erupted in other common law jurisdictions. In doing so, it draws on wider questions 
around the concept of cheating and the specific nature of doping and the measures in place 
to combat the threat of widespread abuse of performance enhancing substances. The 
standard of proof required in questions around non-analytical positives is examined and 
questions around next steps for sport such as a general amnesty are raised. It is also 
suggested that the code of silence pervading some sports around doping issues may be 
combatted by provisions such as the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and that this 
legislation may help to combat some of the mist that surrounds doping control in sport. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cheating has been a malign influence in sport for many years, from the match-fixing scandal 
of the "Chicago Black Sox" that rocked American baseball in 1919, [2] to the "Hand of God" 
incident at the 1986 World Cup, [3] to the Paralympics scandal involving the Spanish 
basketball team. [4] All in their own way have threatened the integrity of the sporting 
competition. However, whilst match-fixing and race-fixing in particular have been high 
profile challenges for sport, [5] it is the threat posed by the use of performance enhancing 
drugs that has become perhaps the most pervasive example of cheating and corruption and 
the biggest threat to its integrity that sport now faces. 
Doping in sport is of course nothing new. [6] However the scandal surrounding Lance 
Armstrong has provided a fresh insight into the measures that some will take in order to 
gain an advantage over their competitors. This paper considers the reasoned 
decision [7] issued by the United States Anti-Doping Agency, (USADA), and places it in the 
context of the scale of the corruption surrounding Lance Armstrong. This will be considered 
and viewed in relation to the philosophy that convinces some to cheat and others to resist 
that temptation. 
The issues raised by the whole Armstrong saga present particular difficulties for those 
responsible for the regulation of sport. This article will focus on some of the key regulatory 
issues that would face sports bodies in the United Kingdom and other common law 
jurisdictions if a case similar in scale and profile to Armstrong were to erupt. In so doing, 
this article will address three key issues that have vexed all those with an interest in the fight 
against doping. 
1. The standard of proof in disciplinary/doping proceedings, particularly when set 
against what can often appear to be the very penal nature of punishments resulting 
from adverse doping findings. 
2. The difficulties surrounding supervision of the decision making of sports governing 
bodies. This issue has again been thrown into the light by the scandals of governance 
engulfing both association football and athletics. Remedies appear to be in short 
supply, particularly in the light of the traditional unavailability of judicial review as a 
remedy not just to athletes against their governing bodies but also perhaps more 
intriguingly as a way for journalists and pressure groups to challenge anything that 
may have the feel of a whitewash or bias about it with regard to the conduct of the 
governing body or anti-doping agency. Despite the unavailability of Judicial Review 
as a remedy against sports governing bodies, it will be shown that similar remedies 
are available which could enhance transparency for anti-doping efforts in UK sport. 
It may also be suggested that this process would be enhanced if governing bodies 
were added to the list of organisations subject to duties under the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 and some of the key regulatory issues around this will be 
outlined. 
The question will be raised in concluding this piece as to whether or not an Armstrong type 
situation would either be more unlikely to occur or conversely would be more thoroughly 
investigated in the event that it occurred in the United Kingdom. It is certainly possible that 
the suggested application of judicial review and the potential listing of sports governing 
bodies under the Freedom of Information Act would help to shine the light necessary to 
prevent or at least moderate the kind of ill governance that appears to have blighted the UCI 
across the whole Armstrong saga. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Lance Armstrong has been an icon of American and world sport since he first won the Tour 
de France in 1999. It should not be forgotten however that he did not come from nowhere. 
His journey to the top was not the trajectory of a stereotypical "doping cheat". Lance had 
history of exceptional achievement. He was World Champion in 1993 at the precocious age 
of 22, [8] but then in October of 1996 disaster struck when he was diagnosed with testicular 
cancer. [9] The cancer ultimately spread to his lungs, abdomen and brain, at which point 
doctors suggested that his survival chance lay at around 40%. [10] That Armstrong survived 
and flourished, going on to win one of the toughest sporting events in the world a record 
seven consecutive times became the stuff of legend. However, his triumphs were mired in 
controversy almost from the word go, and it seemed that rumour and innuendo followed 
Armstrong as his victories continued, [11] until his final win in 2005. [12] 
What has become clear subsequent to Armstrong's "outing" is that every single one of his 
victories was built on the back of performance enhancing drugs. However, one of the key 
questions that remains unanswered though is how on earth did Armstrong get away with it 
and for so long? His first victory came in 1999, the Tour following the Festina 
scandal. [13] That Tour is perhaps significant in the genesis of the Armstrong legend. Cooke 
J., in discussing the importance to cycling, (and the Tour in particular), of Armstrong at that 
moment in time commented; 
Professional cycling desperately needed a knight in shining armour and he duly arrived … 
for the reputation of the sport he needed to be seen to be clean. [14] 
It was of course against that background that Armstrong forged the first of his seven 
victories. He truly was, (or at least appeared to be), the figure that cycling desperately 
needed. Those that administered cycling wanted his to be a true story because of the 
desperate state of cycling at the time and further they saw him as the opportunity to break 
into the American market. The Cycling Independent Reform Commission, (CIRC), 
commented: 
UCI saw Lance Armstrong as the perfect choice to lead the sport's renaissance after the 
Festina scandal: the fact that he was American opened up a new continent for the sport, he 
had beaten cancer and the media quickly made him a global star. [15] 
Those that followed cycling wanted his to be a true story because of him and the 
inspirational account that he was able to tell in surviving cancer and going on to prosper in 
the Tour. It was this perfect storm of human emotion that contributed to the successful 
perpetration of the Armstrong myth. It may also have been this that at least in part, 
persuaded those with questions to ask to refrain from addressing those questions. It is not as 
if there were not suspicions about Armstrong even then, during his first Tour victory. The 
French rider Christophe Bassons was writing a daily column throughout the 1999 Tour for 
the magazine, "Le Parisien". In that column, Bassons commented after one stage that the 
peleton had been "shocked" by the proficiency and strength that Armstrong had shown in 
the most recent mountain stage. [16] Armstrong berated Bassons on the following stage for 
his insinuation that essentially suggested Armstrong may have used an artificial aid to 
improve his climbing performance. In his attack on the Frenchman, Armstrong suggested 
that Bassons should leave cycling altogether for his comments. That it has subsequently been 
revealed that Armstrong tested positive for banned substances on four occasions during the 
1999 Tour [17] provides an interesting insight into his modus operandi. 
For Armstrong, the first real difficulties arose in 1999 when but for a backdated prescription 
for cortisone [18] might have ended his pre-eminence in the Tour de France before it had 
even started. [19] Further problems arose in 2001 during the Tour de Suisse when 
Armstrong returned what according to the Union Cycliste Internationale, (UCI) were 
"questionable" tests. These included results for EPO which the UCI confirmed were strongly 
suspicious but not actually positive. This rather murky explanation was perhaps then 
exacerbated by Armstrong's donation of $125,000 apparently, (according to then UCI 
President Pat McQuaid), to help in their anti-doping efforts rather than as many people may 
have assumed to help cover up a failed or suspicious drugs test. [20] Importantly though 
this revealed vulnerabilities within his entourage as suddenly there were staff on his team, 
in addition to the inner sanctum of his teammates who were clearly aware of and indeed 
aided this falsification [21] and this would ultimately prove significant in his unmasking. 
Nevertheless Armstrong's success continued despite the rumours and innuendos and he 
easily passed the old record of five victories in the Tour which had been jointly held by four 
individuals. [22] 
Controversy however continued to follow Armstrong this time via a confrontation with 
another member of the peleton, Filipe Simeoni. Armstrong had worked with the 
controversial Italian doctor, Michele Ferrari regularly until Ferrari was convicted in the 
Italian courts of sporting fraud. Whilst he was cleared of the more serious allegations of 
providing performance enhancing drugs this was nevertheless a serious issue which 
brought Ferrari a 12 month suspended sentence. [23] This guilty verdict was based 
predominantly on the evidence provided by Filipe Simeoni and Armstrong subsequently 
accused Simeoni of lying which prompted Simeoni to sue Armstrong for defamation. [24] It 
is in response to this that Armstrong allegedly made his infamous "zip the lips" gesture to 
Simeoni, [25] following his unprecedented chase down during the 18th stage of the 2004 
Tour of a lead group which Simeoni had joined. [26] It is instructive that Armstrong 
suggested that following Ferrari's conviction he ended his association with the doctor and 
that Armstrong's agent even went as far as testifying under oath [27] that their professional 
relationship had been terminated. [28] However, evidence suggests that this was not the 
case. Bank records showing payments between the two and witness statements demonstrate 
clearly that close contact remained during 2005, [29] and further affidavits make clear that 
Armstrong retained his professional relationship with Ferrari in the build up to and 
throughout his comeback in 2009-2010. [30] 
Further difficulties emerged for Armstrong in 2004 following his sixth consecutive victory in 
the Tour. This came in the shape of the SCA Arbitration hearing, [31] where Armstrong lied 
under oath when questioned about the his apparent admission to a doctor made in hospital 
whilst undergoing treatment for his cancer that he had never used performance enhancing 
drugs prior to his illness. [32] Then in 2005 the rumours really began to gather pace when 
the French newspaper L'Equipe published "The Armstrong Lie," which connected him to six 
urine samples which had been taken during the 1999 Tour. These it is claimed tested 
positive for EPO. They were however only labelled by number rather than name and 
furthermore were only single samples rather than A and B samples [33] and therefore were 
insufficient, absent of any other evidence, to bring an action against Armstrong. In 2005, 
following his record breaking seventh successive Tour victory, (for which he recorded the 
highest ever average speed at 41.7 Km/h [34] ), Armstrong announced his retirement and 
there perhaps might have ended his "story". However on 9th September 2008, he announced 
his return to cycling with the specific aim of winning the Tour once again. [35] What 
followed however was not the glory that he had hoped for but rather relative failure on the 
road, [36]and further controversy and ultimately sanction off the road as first federal 
prosecutors pursued him and then USADA, culminating in the USADA reasoned decision and 
associated fallout which resulted in Armstrong being stripped of all of his titles and banned 
from competitive cycling for life. 
The remainder of this paper will look at the reasoned decision focussing not only on the 
allegations that were put forward in the report but also questioning what was known and by 
whom with reference to Armstrong's practices throughout his career. Limitations on space 
prevent anything more than questions being raised but nevertheless in light of the rumours 
detailed above and his final confession to Oprah Winfrey [37] it seems pertinent to ask just 
how he managed to "get away with it" for so long? 
3. THE REASONED DECISION 
On 24th August 2012, Lance Armstrong was formerly stripped of his seven Tour de France 
titles and suffered disqualification of all results from 1st August 1998. [38]Following that 
decision it then rested with the USADA as the organisation with results management 
authority [39] to issue Armstrong with an explanation for its actions, which it duly complied 
with when it issued the reasoned decision [40] . There is a danger that all attention will remain 
on this document, perhaps at the expense of a thorough examination of the Federal 
investigation into allegations of doping by Armstrong that was formerly and perhaps 
surprisingly discontinued on 3rd February 2012, following reported political 
pressure. [41] The point is made that none of the evidence gathered by the USADA came 
from that Federal investigation. [42] It seems astonishing that, despite us living in times 
where the signing and apparent effectiveness of memorandums of understanding between 
anti-doping organisations and various arms of law enforcement agencies at both a national 
level, [43] and an international level [44] are proudly announced and further, that we are 
told that Armstrong could not have escaped detection for so long had he committed his 
sporting offences today, [45] that he was nevertheless able to maintain a doping regime 
throughout his illustrious career. It is clear that this was an open secret within the peloton. 
The reasoned decision highlights some almost farcical indicators of Armstrong's guilt, some of 
which were apparent even before his first Tour victory. Indicators such as the carrying of a 
thermos flask, which seemed to be a tell-tale sign of EPO use. [46] The reasoned 
decision explains: 
Jonathan Vaughters also believed Armstrong was likely using EPO-there were some tell-tale 
signs, such as Lance carrying around a thermos. However, prior to the 1998 Vuelta a España 
Vaughters could not be absolutely sure of Armstrong's EPO use. During this time frame 
several riders, in addition to Vaughters, saw Armstrong carrying a thermos and associated it 
with him using EPO. [47] 
With such behaviour, one again has to question the rigour with which those responsible for 
policing their sport were actually acting. With such anecdotal evidence of EPO use, one 
might have expected a concentrated campaign of target testing of Armstrong and his 
teammates. In the aftermath of the Armstrong debacle it is perhaps instructive that Irish 
journalist and former Tour de France competitor Paul Kimmage launched an action against 
both the President and former President of the UCI for "slander/defamation, denigration 
and strong suspicions of fraud", [48] and further that there has been a distinct lack of 
cooperation between the UCI and the World Anti-Doping Agency, (WADA), culminating in 
the refusal of the WADA to engage with the UCI's commission to investigate corruption 
which was established in the wake of the Armstrong scandal. [49] With this kind of 
atmosphere surrounding the organisation charged with protecting the integrity and 
wellbeing of their sport, it is perhaps unsurprising that many have questioned the role of the 
UCI [50] in the obviously ineffective anti-doping regime which allowed Armstrong to evade 
detection throughout his career. 
What perhaps is even more troubling is the atmosphere evident between the UCI on one 
side and the USADA on the other. These are two organisations apparently seeking the same 
goal - that of a drugs free sport and yet the open hostility evidenced between these two 
organisations even before the reasoned decision was published as they bickered over who had 
jurisdiction in pursuing Armstrong [51] displays for all to see that there were other agendas 
at play rather than a desire to work towards a common goal of dealing with drug abuse in 
the sport. 
The UCI has had at times a difficult association with not just USADA but other 
organisations, and individuals who are involved in anti-doping and in particular with the 
WADA and it is likely that problems with this relationship helped to sour that with USADA. 
The origins of the problems may be traced back to the relationship between Dick Pound, (the 
first President of the WADA), and Hein Verbruggen, (President of the UCI from 1992-2005). 
Verbruggen supported Jacques Rogge over Pound in his successful action to succeed Juan 
Antonio Samaranch as President of the International Olympic Committee and it appears that 
this may have been the starting point for the conflict [52]which would ultimately spill over 
to have serious consequences for anti-doping policy in cycling. The CIRC comments: 
It is the CIRC's view that the conflict between these two men as well as their very different 
philosophies of fighting doping in sport soured the relationship between the UCI and 
WADA, which adversely affected the fight against doping. [53] 
The CIRC relates that the problems between the WADA and the UCI appeared almost from 
the very birth of the former. From a resistance to the standard two year ban for a doping 
offence, to a reluctance to adopt the first WADA Code, [54] it seemed that the UCI were 
reluctant to work in partnership with the fledgling organisation. Perhaps more important 
however was a fundamental disagreement over the very nature of the organisation. The 
personal animosity between the two men seemed to spill over to their professional 
relationship as they adopted radically differing views of the nature of the WADA, (and by 
definition other anti-doping agencies too). On the one hand, Verbruggen viewed the WADA 
very much as an agency to support and help governing bodies. He commented, "Pound is 
positioning WADA as the watchdog and that is not its role. It should be an aid agency, not a 
police agency against sport". [55] Pound's view on the role of the WADA on the other hand 
was far from that envisaged by Verbruggen. Bose reports his comments: 
We are not just a support agency, quite the opposite … WADA is the international agency 
whose job is to report on compliance and non-compliance with the code. [56] 
This viewpoint is clearly shared by the USADA which makes the point in the Reasoned 
Decision that: 
USADA exists to enforce the rules against cheating through the use of performance 
enhancing drugs regardless of whether those rules are broken by the famous or the 
anonymous. [57] 
This would clearly involve at times holding governing bodies to account in the event of 
perceived failures in anti-doping policy and may therefore be viewed as something that 
would impact on the independence of governing bodies and their role as sole governors of 
their sports. The potential conflict, that these differing opinions on the role of the WADA 
and the USADA may cause are obvious. Whilst one might expect personal relationships to 
alter over time, particularly when the personnel involved change, this proved not to be the 
case when Verbruggen stepped down to be replaced by Pat McQuaid as President of the 
UCI in 2005. The CIRC report; 
Pat McQuaid inherited the difficult relationship between Hein Verbruggen and 
WADA/Dick Pound. Pat McQuaid did not disassociate himself from that dispute. Instead, it 
appears that he sided from the beginning of his presidency with Hein Verbruggen and that 
did little to ease the conflict. Examples of this can be found in Pat McQuaid's published 
letter to the French Ministry of Sport and Dick Pound(dated 3 July 2006) and in his calling 
publicly for Dick Pound's dismissal from WADA. [58] 
The relationship continued to deteriorate when the UCI launched defamation proceedings 
against Dick Pound, and indeed several other stakeholders around that time and prompted 
the CIRC to comment: 
It seemed to have been part of the UCI's strategy to threaten and/or serve their opponents 
or critics with legal actions, be it before state courts or ethical commissions. [59] 
That this antipathy might affect the relationship that the UCI had with other stakeholders, 
(in particular other anti-doping agencies such as USADA), seemed likely and indeed that 
was acknowledged by the CIRC. [60] The most worrying aspect of this was of course the 
impact that these problematic relationships might have on anti-doping within cycling. 
Indeed it has only been subsequent to USADA's Reasoned Decision that reforms have been 
put in place at least in part to separate anti-doping operations within cycling from the UCI 
leadership. [61] 
The aftermath of the pursuit of Armstrong has shown little or no signs of leading to a thaw 
in the relationship between the two organisations as further tensions remain evident. [62] It 
can only be hoped that the appointment of Brian Cookson as new President of the 
UCI, [63] replacing Pat McQuaid, in September 2013 will facilitate a more positive 
relationship between the organisations. 
It is clearly tempting to view the USADA as the "clean" organisation seeking to maintain a 
drug free sport and to pursue those it suspects of cheating to the fullest extent and the UCI 
as the organisation mired in controversy and seemingly dragging its heels in attempting to 
maintain a drug free sport. One might argue that the UCI as the guardian and promoter of 
its sport has a conflict of interests that might tempt it to maintain a silence around doping 
issues - a conflict that the USADA do not have. However the USADA do not escape judicial 
criticism, an issue which they appear to gloss over in the reasoned opinion. Their "woefully 
inadequate charging letter", [64] drew criticism from the Court in Armstrong v 
Tygart [65] and it is certainly possible as one or two appear to have done, to view the pursuit 
of Armstrong as something of a personal mission for Travis Tygart and the 
USADA. [66] The bottom line though remained the desire of the USADA to maintain a drug 
free sport on the one hand against Lance Armstrong's right to protect his past and future 
career on the other. 
In seeking to address concerns about the balance of rights, The Court made clear reference to 
the safeguards in place that may serve to ease fears that Armstrong would not be treated 
fairly. However, despite their obvious misgivings with the process and balance of power, 
they concluded, "the Court finds the USADA arbitration rules ... are sufficiently robust to 
satisfy ... due process". [67] The Court was comfortable with Armstrong's options and the 
degree of protection offered to Armstrong via the operation of International arbitration 
system and in particular the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Sparks commented; 
Alternatively, even if the Court has jurisdiction over Armstrong's remaining claims, the 
Court finds they are best resolved through the well- established system of international 
arbitration, by those with expertise in the field. [68] 
The Court continued: 
Armstrong has ample appellate avenues open to him, first to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, (CAS), where he is entitled to de novo review, and then to the courts of Switzerland, 
as permitted by Swiss law, if he so elects. [69] 
The question may however be asked, particularly in the light of the ongoing case involving 
German speed-skater Claudia Pechstein as to whether the Court was right to have such faith 
in the International arbitration process. 
The balance in terms of the protection of athlete rights offered by the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport and the Swiss Federal Tribunal, (SFT) has recently been thrown into doubt by the 
decision of the Munich Court of Appeals to refuse to recognise the CAS arbitration award in 
the case of Claudia Pechstein who had originally been banned from competing due to 
irregularities with her Biological Passport profile. That this case had been through the CAS, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal, and a further request for revision before the SFT proved 
irrelevant as the Munich Court to whom Pechstein had brought her case cited concern over 
compatibility with German cartel law and public policy.[70] The progress of the case raises 
real concerns about the finality of decisions rendered by the CAS and therefore calls into 
question the status of sports ability to govern itself. Diathesopoulou comments: 
Challenging the validity of CAS awards before national courts, however, is something new 
under the sun of sports arbitration and could prove fatal for the finality of CAS awards, 
which is a sine qua non safeguard of procedural equal treatment among athletes and legal 
coherence in sports law. [71] 
The particular problem was not with the award itself but more the process by which it was 
arrived at. The ISU, (the governing body), much like the vast majority of sports governing 
bodies, (absent perhaps boxing and to a lesser degree darts), enjoys a monopolistic position 
in the governance of their sport and essentially force their participants to accept compulsory 
arbitration by the CAS. This in itself may not be problematic when one considers it in the 
light of the acknowledged specificity of sport, [72] and the clear need for there to be 
consistency in the administration of sports. What made the CAS decision problematic were 
processes around the decision. Diathesopoulou comments: 
… the Court hold that the arbitration agreement as a prerequisite to the athlete's 
participation in competitions does not constitute per se an abuse of a dominant position, 
since it responds to the specificity of sport and particularly to the need of consistency in 
sports disputes. However, considering the decisive influence of sports organizations on the 
selection and appointment of arbitrators under the CAS regulations, the Court concluded 
that the independence of CAS is questionable. In this light, forcing the athletes to sign an 
arbitration agreement in favour of a rather dependent and partial tribunal would constitute 
an abuse of the international sports organizations' dominant position in the market, thereby 
infringing the mandatory German antitrust law. [73] 
The Court's conclusion was that the dominant position enjoyed by the ISU meant that the 
terms it imposed upon Ms Pechstein, (compulsory arbitration in the CAS), were contrary to 
the German Act against restraints of Competition. Further that the choice of arbitrators 
under the then existing rules was biased in favour of the ISU and therefore by definition 
other governing bodies. Voser comments: 
The court furthermore noted that the structural imbalance between athletes and sports-
related bodies is aggravated by the fact that in all disputes concerning decisions of sports-
related bodies, the president of the arbitral tribunal is directly appointed by the President of 
the CAS Appeals Division who is a member of the International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport ("ICAS"), a body that is highly dependent on the sports-related bodies. According to 
the Higher Court, athletes accept this one-sided designation of the CAS arbitrators only 
because they have no choice if they want to compete at an international level. [74] 
Pechstein's case was heard by the CAS before the reforms of 2012 which brought greater 
independence to the process of selecting arbitrators, removing the quotas of arbitrators 
nominated by governing bodies and similar organisations. [75] It is therefore possible that 
this case may prove to be a one off and that the rendering of sports arbitration decisions will 
continue to rest easily with the CAS. Should this prove not to be the case then we may be in 
for further CAS reform. Diathesopoulou, in making this point stresses; 
Therefore, a potential institutional reform of the CAS to ensure independence and 
impartiality coupled with a more stringent review of its awards by the SFT should bring 
about a more restraint approach of national courts when reviewing CAS awards' compliance 
with domestic public policy and ensure the subsequent finality of CAS awards. [76] 
Sport can ill-afford to be left without a common final dispute resolution mechanism and it is 
possible to see how this process may not be the safeguard for Armstrong that perhaps the 
Texas Court had suggested. 
The Court in Armstrong v Tygart, [77] also drew attention to perhaps an issue of concern in 
the USADA's pursuit of Armstrong. It stated, "it appears USADA's evidence will revolve 
more around eyewitness testimony than lab results". [78] What this meant of course was that 
the smoking gun of a failed test was lacking and that this therefore left a slightly 
unsatisfactory taste in the mouth. The consequences of the lack of a test failure meant that 
the USADA had to prove to the comfortable satisfaction [79] of the hearing panel as per Article 
3.1 of the WADA Code, that Armstrong was guilty of doping and that it was clear that the 
evidence presented to try and achieve this was based on banking records and affidavits from 
some of Armstrong's closest associates. [80] With these sworn statements, there was 
sufficient evidence that had stacked up against Armstrong to satisfy the standard 
necessitated by Article 3.1. The standard itself has been the subject of some conjecture. 
McLaren explains the origin of the approach: 
This standard of proof originates from court decisions in Australia and other 
Commonwealth countries that created a standard of proof that involved the personal 
reputation of the athlete; the standard is more stringent than the balance of probability but 
less burdensome than beyond a reasonable doubt. [81] 
Whilst the applicability of the approach to some doping violations seems reasonable enough, 
it may also be suggested that the approach is inappropriate for more serious allegations of 
doping such as those faced by Armstrong. The issues facing Armstrong were obviously 
career threatening and potentially chronically serious in terms of his personal 
reputation, [82] his financial security [83] and his future prosperity. Athletes who are 
subsequently cleared of any wrongdoing can see the stain of doping remain on their public 
persona. A problem acknowledged following the case involving Andrus Veerpalu who had 
been accused of taking Human Growth Hormone. Alexander wrote in the aftermath of him 
being cleared: 
Veerpalu fought the doping charges, taking the case all the way to the Swiss-based Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS). With Berry and Fischer acting as expert witnesses on Veerpalu's 
behalf, the arbitration panel found for Veerpalu in 2013, saying the WADA test was 
"unreliable." As Fischer and Berry point out, despite being exonerated, Veerpalu emerged 
irrevocably tarnished, with many, including WADA, insisting he got off on a technicality. To 
Berry and Fischer, this exemplifies why tests must be as scientifically rigorous as possible, to 
avoid unfairly leaving an athlete's reputation in ruins. [84] 
Similarly, the Australian Lawyers Alliance highlighted that, "the consequences from adverse 
findings for sports people can be devastating both personally and professionally". [85] It is 
therefore imperative that mistakes are not made and evidence and standards of proof are as 
rigorous as possible. Bearing this in mind it is arguable that the proof must be higher in the 
more serious cases than that required in less serious cases of doping. Those charged with 
outing doping offenders would argue that the approach outlined in Article 3.1 [86] is 
entirely appropriate. It is the case that the standard has clearly been approved by the 
CAS, [87] which has taken the view that a doping violation is a disciplinary issue rather than 
a criminal one and that therefore the approach should be somewhere between the 
civil standard of on the balance of probabilities and the criminal standard of beyond reasonable 
doubt. [88] But is it the case that this should justify the utilisation of a standard of proof that 
places athletes in a vulnerable position against the much more powerful 
adversaries [89] who may be attempting to end their careers and potentially cause associated 
serious financial losses. It may be suggested that the article itself clearly accounts for those in 
a similar position to Armstrong who may find their careers in jeopardy. The standard overtly 
accounts for the "seriousness of the allegation" being brought and that may be seen as a 
sufficient safeguard for any participant - therefore in effect, the more serious the allegation 
then the more stringent the proof needs to be. In principle, this sounds straightforward. In 
practice however, the question pertaining to the appropriate standard of proof is a 
complicated one. Davis comments: 
…there are established common law principles that determine who has the burden of proof 
in both criminal and civil cases. The question that then arises is what the standard of proof 
should be. The basic principle of the common law system is that the standard of proof in 
criminal cases is beyond reasonable doubt. Where the defendant raises a defence, the lower 
civil balance of probabilities standard applies. A closer examination, however, shows that it 
is a little more complicated in relation to civil matters, and that it is in fact a sliding scale that 
operates, depending on how serious the allegation is. [90] 
The origin of the approach adopted in Article 3.1 World Anti-Doping Agency Code, 
(WADC) 2015, (that of comfortable satisfaction), is an Australian divorce case where Justice 
Rich commented: 
In a serious matter like a charge of adultery the satisfaction of a just and prudent mind 
cannot be produced by slender and exiguous proofs or circumstances pointing with a 
wavering finger to an affirmative conclusion. The nature of the allegation requires as a 
matter of common sense and worldly wisdom the careful weighing of testimony, the close 
examination of facts proved as a basis of inference and a comfortable satisfaction that the 
tribunal has reached both a correct and just conclusion. But to say this is not to lay it down 
as a matter of law that such complete and absolute certainty must be reached as is ordinarily 
described in a criminal charge as "satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt." A petition for 
dissolution of marriage is not quasi-criminal, whatever the grounds. [91] (emphasis added) 
It is of course questionable whether what was originally intended to help manage divorce 
cases is appropriate in doping investigations where both a person's livelihood and 
reputation may be very publically at risk. There are arguably some analogies with divorce in 
terms of reputational damage, particularly given the context of the time this case was 
considered when perhaps divorce was a more serious issue than may be the case today. But 
whilst such reputational damage may have been present, it would not have been so open to 
the public gaze and in no way would have posed the same risk to the livelihood of the 
individuals concerned that a doping investigation and subsequent conviction does. 
Perhaps of greater relevance in discussing the appropriate standard of proof may be the 
case Birmingham City Council v Riaz, [92] which involved attempts by Birmingham City 
Council to keep a vulnerable 17 year old girl safe from ten identified males by obtaining a 
Secure Accommodation Order. In the case, the Court made wide-ranging injunctions 
preventing the men from approaching not just named individuals but any female under the 
age of 18, not already known to them in any public place. It was assessed that there was no 
possibility of securing a criminal conviction against these men, hence the reason for the 
innovative use of process to obtain such far reaching injunctions against them. The men 
were named in Court and more interestingly were able to be named by the Press. The 
standard of proof applied here was that of thebalance of probabilities. It is clear that the 
reputational damage that these men may potentially face is far beyond that of a divorce case 
and also that of any doping violation, (even one as serious as that of Armstrong), but here 
mechanisms were used which ensured that a standard of proof below the criminal one was 
used. This aspect of the decision has drawn criticism perhaps best summed up by Downs 
who commented: 
Keehan J just asserted that the civil standard of proof applies but he does not address the 
case law which has developed concerning ASBOs [93] (e.g. R (on the application of 
Cleveland Police) v Haggas [2009] EWHC 3231; [2011] 1 WLR 2512 which emphasised that 
whilst these are civil proceedings, because of the seriousness of the matters to be proved and 
the implications of the resulting Orders, the criminal standard of proof or something 
virtually indistinguishable from it should be used. [94] 
This then returns us to the standard of comfortable satisfaction in the circumstances i.e. the 
more serious the circumstances the more rigorous the proof would need to be to leave the 
panel comfortably satisfied. As far as the Court of Arbitration for Sport is concerned, the 
protections offered by this standard match the rigorous requirements highlighted above by 
Downs: 
As often becomes evident when the question of standard of proof is debated, the debate 
looms larger in theory than practice. … In all cases the degree of probability must be 
commensurate with and proportionate to those allegations; the more serious the allegation 
the higher the degree of probability, or "comfort", required. That is because, in general, the 
more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the alleged event occurred and, hence, the 
stronger the evidence required before the occurrence of the event is demonstrated to be 
more probable than not. … From this perspective, and in view of the nature and gravity of 
the allegations at issue in these proceedings, there is no practical distinction between the 
standards of proof advocated by USADA and the Respondents. It makes little, if indeed any, 
difference whether a "beyond reasonable doubt" or "comfortable satisfaction" standard is 
applied to determine the claims against the Respondents. [95] 
It is the circumstances that are crucial in deciding at what level the panel 
becomes comfortably satisfied. Thus the more serious the allegation and ergo the consequences 
of a proved allegation then the more compelling the proof must be. That at least is the theory. 
It is here that the cumulative effect of evidence becomes crucial. Davis comments further: 
the analogy that is often made is that of the cumulative strength of the strains of rope, or the 
links in a chain, though in the latter it is to emphasise that the evidence may only be as 
strong as its weakest 'link'. [96] 
A concern over the appropriate standards of proof in sports disciplinary cases has not been 
limited to doping sanctions. This very issue was the subject of an appeal to the British 
Horseracing Authority in the case involving race fixing. [97] The rules of racing were quite 
clear on the applicable standard - that of the balance of probabilities. Schedule (A) 6 
paragraph 16 stated; 
Where any fact or matter is required to be established to the satisfaction of the Authority, the 
standard of proof shall be the civil standard which is to say the standard applied in the civil 
courts of England in a dispute between private Persons concerning a matter of comparative 
seriousness to the subject matter of the enquiry. [98] 
Nevertheless the appellants contended that due to the seriousness of the allegations against 
them, that the balance of probabilities was inappropriate and that the criminal standard 
should have been applied. It was made clear in the hearing that the matter of the 
appropriate standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings in general is far from settled, with 
different approaches being adopted in areas such as health, where the approach is typically 
on the balance of probabilities and is similarly the case in policing matters. In questions 
around exclusion of pupils from school, the standard also remains that of the balance of 
probabilities. [99] In the sports world, in anti-doping, the preference has been for a standard 
of comfortable satisfaction, [100] where the anti-doping organisation is trying to establish a 
doping violation and similarly the same approach is taken in in cricket disciplinary 
tribunals. [101] The panel concluded in this particular instance that; 
Although, as we accept, the charges against these appellants were serious and the 
consequences, particularly for the jockeys were serious, they were not criminal proceedings. 
… Since the simplification of the position in civil litigation brought about by the decision 
in Re B, the Panel decided that the Rule requires decision of all matters before the Panel by 
application of the balance of probabilities test. [102] 
It is interesting to note that Lord Phillips in R (on the application of McCann), made the point 
concerning the imposition of anti-social behaviour orders: 
Many injunctions in civil proceedings operate severely upon those against whom they are 
ordered. In matrimonial proceedings a husband may be ordered to leave his home and not 
to have contact with his children. Such an order may be made as a consequence of violence 
which amounted to criminal conduct. But such an order is imposed not for the purpose of 
punishment but for protection of the family. This demonstrates that, when considering 
whether an order imposes a penalty or punishment, it is necessary to look beyond its 
consequence and to consider its purpose. [103] 
The effect of these is typically to exclude individuals from particular areas at particular 
times. The argument had been made that these were criminal proceedings and therefore 
hearsay evidence should have been excluded. That being the case, the criminal standard of 
proof would apply, (the discussion was centred around what standard was appropriate). In 
rejecting that argument, Lord Phillips as can be seen, highlighted the intention and impact of 
such an order. The intention is to protect potential victims such as family, and to look at the 
broad purpose behind the imposition of such orders which is preventative rather than 
punitive. It is possible to extrapolate this rationale to doping bans. The broad purpose must 
be to protect sport in general from the corruption of doping and more specifically to enable 
other athletes to compete in a drug free environment. In other words to protect the family 
involved in sport from the actions of the doper. The words of Lord Phillips resonate with the 
vision of the WADA which is, "A world where all athletes can compete in a doping-free 
sporting environment" and its mission, "to lead a collaborative worldwide movement for 
doping-free sport". [104]Intended impact is preventative and wide ranging rather than being 
targeted at punishment of individuals. The impact upon guilty individuals may be 
restrictive but arguably not punitive and therefore arguments in favour of the civil standard 
of proof to apply should perhaps gain greater credence. 
In French v Australian Sports Commission, the CAS accepted that where the allegations are 
serious, then the standard must be at a higher level than that of the balance of 
probabilities, [105] and that at times this standard may end up being, in echoes of the Gaines 
reasoning, almost indistinguishable from that of beyond reasonable doubt. [106]One may 
question that if this is the case, then why not simply apply an overt criminal standard and 
remove the possibility for debate completely? Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss hinted at this 
very point in re U (A Child) (Department for education and Skills intervening), commenting on 
the submission of care orders: 
We understand that in many applications for care orders counsel are now submitting that 
the correct approach to the standard of proof is to treat the distinction between criminal and 
civil standards as 'largely illusory'. In our judgment this approach is mistaken. [107] 
Recent dicta from the House of Lords and the Supreme Court in the United Kingdom would 
appear to cast some doubt on the applicability of any hybrid civil approach ofcomfortable 
satisfaction and further whether the reality really is or should be that the approach is almost 
indistinguishable from the criminal standard. [108] It would appear inGaines, highlighted 
above that there is the possibility of confusion between the applicable standard of proof and 
the likelihood of an event taking place. Lord Hoffman in re B, commented on this issue: 
Some confusion has however been caused by dicta which suggests that the standard of proof 
may vary with the gravity of the misconduct alleged or even the seriousness of the 
consequences for the person concerned. [109] 
Further Lady Hale in S-B Children [110] affirmed that there exists no elevated civil standard 
of proof. It seems that the confusion has arisen when; in echoes of Hoffman above; assessing 
the probability of whether an event has taken place or not. Lady Hale, citing Lord Nicholls 
in re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) went on: 
… this does not mean that where a serious allegation is in issue the standard of proof 
required is higher. It means only that the inherent probability or improbability of an event is 
itself a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding 
whether, on balance, the event occurred. The more improbable the event, the stronger must 
be the evidence that it did occur, before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be 
established. 
To put it into Armstrong's context, the likelihood that he was able to get away with doping 
for so long was extraordinary and therefore the proof to "convict" him must be extremely 
rigorous in order to satisfy the standard of proof. Lord Hoffman concluded clearly on the 
issue of the existence of a hybrid or modified civil standard of proof, stating: 
I think that the time has come to say, once and for all, that there is only one civil standard of 
proof and that it is proof that the fact in issue more probably occurred than not. I do not 
intend to disapprove any of the cases in what I have called the first category, but I agree 
with the observation of Lord Steyn inMcCann's case (at 812) that clarity would be greatly 
enhanced if the courts said simply that although the proceedings were civil, the nature of the 
particular issue involved made it appropriate to apply the criminal standard. [111] 
This would seem to be an eminently sensible route to take with regards to proof of doping 
violations and would undoubtedly ease some concerns that athletes may have around due 
process worries and in practical terms it would appear that it would actually make little 
tangible difference to the results from hearing panels. 
There is further protection for the accused athlete beyond concerns over the applied 
standard of proof, in that if they seek to rebut any particular presumptions in a doping 
charge, (such as the reliability of laboratory analysis/chain of custody etc), then they will 
only need to overcome the burden of on the balance of probabilities, [112] in order to win their 
case. 
Whilst the approach for an athlete accused of a doping offence therefore appears to have 
some safeguards, it is curious that in another area of sporting corruption, (that of match 
fixing), the balance of power shifts even further towards the accusatory body. Köllerer v 
ATP, [113] made it clear that the standard of proof should be that of apreponderance of the 
evidence, (i.e. the balance of probabilities). [114] At the heart of this reasoning lay the 
contractual nature of the relationship between the participant and his governing 
body. [115] This was the standard contained in the governing body rules and the standard to 
which Köllerer had agreed to be bound in previous years. [116] It is the case that some mild 
criticism is made in Köllerer concerning the lack of a universal standard in all sports for 
match fixing cases. [117] However, the point is made: 
The CAS has neither the function nor the authority to harmonise regulations by imposing a 
uniform standard of proof, where, as in the current case, an association decides to apply a 
different, specific standard in its regulations. [118] 
It would therefore seem perverse to advocate a change in the approach, to that of comfortable 
satisfaction, which is explicitly accounted for in the WADC and further thestandard to which 
Armstrong and all other competitors across the world who are subject to the WADC have 
signed up to. The solution for change would be to lobby WADA to amend the Code. It is the 
contractual nature of the relationship that is fundamental to the acceptance of this standard 
and this has been confirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal which is similarly of the view 
that it is private law that governs doping disputes due to the contractual nature of the 
relationship between the parties. [119] 
It is the private law nature of the relationship between a participant and governing body 
which has enabled the English Courts to justify their refusal to allow the remedy ofJudicial 
Review for particular issues involving sports participants and their governing 
bodies. [120] This reasoning hence justifies the refusal to require proof beyond reasonable 
doubt of a doping violation in order to secure a doping "conviction". It is though arguable 
that the adherence to the notion that the relationship is a contractual one between 
participants and their governing bodies is based more on dogma and history than on any 
sound legal basis, one which fails to acknowledge the nature of the relationship involved 
and instead focuses too clearly on the structure of that relationship. [121] It is nevertheless 
an important issue in the context of the difficulties faced by participants such as Lance 
Armstrong for it is the private law principal that appears to lie at the heart of the refusal of 
the CAS and SFT to countenance a preference for beyond reasonable doubt over the less 
forgiving standard of comfortable satisfaction. 
There have been several cases in England that have explored the relationship of participants 
and their governing bodies in the context of whether Judicial Review should be available as 
a remedy for participants. The Courts have always answered this question in the negative, 
although this has not prevented remedies which have to a degree matched those offered by 
Judicial Review from emerging in recent years. It may therefore be instructive at this 
juncture to briefly examine the notion of Judicial Review and the notion that whilst the 
relationship may be a contractual one, this has nevertheless not prevented suitable remedies 
from emerging via the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of the Courts. [122] As stated above, 
it is arguably the case that the private law nature of the relationship has encouraged the 
application of the standard ofcomfortable satisfaction but this has not prevented suitable 
remedies from emerging via the supervisory function of the Courts in the absence of Judicial 
Review, so it should perhaps be the same with regards to the appropriate standard to be 
applied in doping cases. 
The origins of Judicial Review can be traced back to Rooke's case, [123] where in a dispute 
concerning the maintenance and repair of a river bank, the decisions made by The 
Commissioners of Sewers in relation to collection of monies were examined in the Court of 
Common Pleas. In concluding that their decisions must be made in accordance with the law 
and with reason, the Court stated: 
… and notwithstanding the words of the commission give authority to the commissioners to 
do according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to be limited and bound with 
the rule of reason and law (A). For discretion is a science or understanding to discern 
between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, 
between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to their wills 
and private affections. [124] 
The principle that decisions taken by such administrative bodies as the Commissioners of 
Sewers must be reasonable and that this would if necessary be supervised by the courts was 
strengthened in 1608 by Dr Bonham's case. [125] The case itself involved Bonham, (a 
Cambridge graduate in medicine), who was refused permission to practice in London unless 
he first obtained a licence from the Royal College of Physicians. This he refused to do and 
ultimately he was imprisoned by the College under authority of a royal grant, which had 
been expressly confirmed by an Act of Parliament. Bonham brought an action for false 
imprisonment. The key issue was the authority granted to the Royal College by the statute. 
It was clear that it gave authority for the College to administer fines against Bonham, (of 
which the College were permitted to retain 50% of any fine levied, with the other 50% going 
to the crown). However, Sir Edward Coke, (the Chief Justice and fellow Cambridge 
graduate), expressed concern that the effect of the legislation was such as to permit the 
College to both bring the action against Bonham and to act as Judge in the trial. Coke 
commented: 
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul [sic] Acts of 
Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament 
is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the 
common law will controul [sic] it, and adjudge such Act to be void. [126] 
The youthful concept was supported later in Day v Savadge, [127] where Hobart, the new 
Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas stated, "…even an Act of Parliament, made 
against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in itself". [128] 
It can be seen that even in these very old cases the issue of possible bias or at least of a 
conflict of interests was of real concern to the courts and further that they felt it appropriate 
to intervene even where this may mean setting a collision with Parliament and the Crown. 
Thus we saw the beginnings of the concept of judicial review. 
In Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister of the Civil Service, [129] Lord Diplock laid out 
what he saw as three distinct grounds upon which an applicant may launch an action for 
Judicial Review against a susceptible body. He commented: 
The first ground I would call "illegality," the second "irrationality" and the third "procedural 
impropriety … By "illegality" as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker 
must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give 
effect to it … By "irrationality" I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 
Wednesbury unreasonableness [130] … I have described the third head as "procedural 
impropriety" rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with 
procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because 
susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative 
tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative 
instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve 
any denial of natural justice. [131] 
The first significant sporting case in this area was that of Law v National Greyhound Racing 
Club Ltd. [132] The facts of the case are fairly typical of the cases that have come before the 
courts in this area. The plaintiff's training licence had been suspended for six months by the 
defendant, (a limited company who were effectively the governing body of greyhound 
racing in England, Wales and Scotland), on the grounds that one of his greyhounds had 
tested positive for a banned substance in breach of rule 174(ii)(a) of the rules of racing. 
Beyond the bare facts of the case however, there was one very obvious difference between 
Law and the other significant cases in this area. [133] In the case in hand, it was the 
governing body, the National Greyhound Racing Club, (NGRC), who attempted to establish 
that Judicial Review was the appropriate mechanism for challenging the decisions of the 
disciplinary panels of sports governing bodies. Lawton L.J. commented: 
They have tried to persuade this court that, on the correct construction of section 31 of the 
Supreme Court Act 1981, when a domestic tribunal is alleged to have made, in abuse of its 
powers, a decision which affects a member of the public or the public generally, the 
complainant must apply for judicial review and cannot proceed by way of an action or an 
originating summons for either a declaration or an injunction. [134] 
In contrast, in the other significant cases exploring this issue, it has been the governing body 
seeking to persuade the Court to deny an application for Judicial Review to the participant. 
It is therefore the governing body remaining faithful to the principal that the athlete is in a 
contractual/private law relationship with their governing body and that this justifies 
denying Judicial Review as a remedy concerning issues around disciplinary processes. It 
may be argued that it is this adherence to the concept of the nature of the athlete's 
relationship that is used to justify retaining the standard of proof laid out 
in Collins, [135] Boevski, [136] Gundel [137] and more latterly in the WADA Code itself. 
Should that though be the end of the matter? If we are to accept the public/private law 
distinction outlined briefly above as justification for denial of Judicial Review then it would 
seem that this thinking might also be applied to the standard of proof in relation to doping. 
However, it is arguable that the reasoning demonstrated in the line of cases relating to 
Judicial Review [138] is wrong. The thinking behind the decisions is neatly summed up in 
one of the most recent cases in this area, where, Stanley Burton J. noted: 
… the Jockey Club cannot enforce its rules otherwise than by means of its contracts, or the 
exercise of its property rights. None of its rules have any statutory force. [139] 
It is perhaps possible to make the point that due to the threat to the integrity of sport and 
more widely to the health and wellbeing of participants, that the on-going 
pharmaceuticalisation of sport at the highest level warrants greater judicial scrutiny than is 
currently afforded via very clearly private law mechanisms. The value of sport to society is 
clear [140] and the importance attached to fair competition and equality of access would 
appear to provide compelling justification for removing at least in part the level of self-
regulation enjoyed by sport. If we are to remove a pillar of that self-regulation then does this 
mean that we also compromise the nature of the contractual relationship that sports 
governing bodies have with their governing bodies? 
The Courts in England and Wales have gradually used private law remedies to ape the 
effects of Judicial Review and this has led to around the nature of the obligations owed by 
governing bodies. van Kleef comments: 
Since Bradley, it can be argued that sports governing bodies owe broadly the same 
obligations as a matter of private law as they would if their decisions were susceptible to the 
public law remedy of judicial review. [141] 
Oliver has argued forcefully that the public/private notion necessitated by Judicial Review 
is misleading and that the key consideration lies in the nature of the role of supervision. She 
comments: 
Another way of describing these grounds would be as principles of good administration. 
Public lawyers are, of course, familiar with the way in which such duties are imposed in 
judicial review. But duties of this kind are also implied in many contracts, especially 
contracts of employment; in the rules of trade unions relating to membership and office-
holders; in the relations between students and universities; and in the fields of mutual 
insurance, self-regulatory bodies in business and sport and the duties of company 
directors. [142] 
In highlighting what she views as an artificial distinction between the notion of Judicial 
Review per se, and the impact of the principles of Judicial Review, she concludes; 
The privileges afforded by Order 53 [143] may be justified where political mechanisms are in 
place to check their abuse, but not in the absence of such protections. Thus central and local 
government and other bodies under direct or indirect political control may be entitled to 
rely on Order 53, but bodies such as regulators in sport should not logically be so entitled. 
Such bodies may nevertheless be under duties of legality, fairness and rationality. [144] 
Thus the distinction offered by the contractual relationship in terms of Judicial Review 
ineligibility may be an artificial one, with, as Oliver points out in Scotland for instance the 
term Judicial Review applies to the Court's supervisory jurisdiction inconsequential of 
whether the relationship is a public or private one. [145] 
In the USA, Statute precludes such judicial scrutiny, [146] at least where amateur and 
Olympic sports are concerned, citing the precedence of internal measures and then 
arbitration with the opportunity for judicial scrutiny only arising if the alternative measures 
would cause unnecessary delay. [147] However, the position is not or at least perhaps 
should not be quite so straightforward. The nature of the role of sports governing bodies is 
complex and some might suggest a quasi-public one as explained by Jack Straw who 
commenting on the specific nature of the Jockey Club stated: 
The Jockey Club is a curious body: it is entirely private in nature, but exercises public 
functions in some respects, and to those extents, but to no other, it would be regarded as 
falling within [this classification of a quasi-public body]. [148] 
Such sports governing bodies, whilst not having their authority drawn from statute or 
delegated legislation, nevertheless possess the kind of relationship with their athletes 
normally reserved for public bodies or private ones carrying out a public function. The 
status of quasi-public bodies became more nuanced in relation to the Human Rights Act once 
the Bill was passed and the question persisted as to whether or not sports governing bodies 
may be defined as falling within the remit of the legislation. Lord Nicholls inAston 
Cantlow [149] made reference to some of these issues commenting on the nature of public 
function: 
What, then, is the touchstone to be used in deciding whether a function is public for this 
purpose? Clearly there is no single test of universal application. There cannot be, given the 
diverse nature of governmental functions and the variety of means by which these functions 
are discharged today. Factors to be taken into account include the extent to which in 
carrying out the relevant function the body is publicly funded, or is exercising statutory 
powers, or is taking the place of central government or local authorities, or is providing a 
public service. [150] 
Gray J. went further in The Jockey Club v Buffham, [151] stating, (obiter), that, "the Jockey Club 
is a public authority in every sense of that term". Anderson in summing up his reading of 
the position in reference to the Human Rights Act 1998 comments: 
It is further suggested that Lord Nicholls's view is consistent with the broad reading of the 
HRA 1998 intended by the legislature. In alluding to that parliamentary intention, it is 
noteworthy that the Jockey Club itself was of the view that its authority would be 
encompassed by s. 6(3)(b), as premised on remarks made by the then Home Secretary, Jack 
Straw, during the committee stage of the Human Rights Bill. [152] 
This question was later referenced directly in the case Rubython v Federation Internationale De 
L'automobile and another, [153] where the claimant was seeking injunctive relief against the 
decision of the Federation Internationale De L'automobile, [154] (FIA), to deny him press 
accreditation and therefore access to "The Paddock", which in turn would inhibit his ability 
to publish his new Formula 1 magazine. The central point in question was summed up by 
Gray J., who, in contrast to his view on the Jockey Club commented: 
Mr Price has to put his case on the footing that the FIA, because of its governing position in 
relation to motor sport, is a public authority. If it is not a public authority, Mr Price accepts 
that there can be no question of an entitlement to sue under the Human Rights Act. There is 
authority, admittedly in the context of judicial review, that a governing sports body is not a 
public authority, namely R (on the application of Aga Khan) v Jockey Club [1993] 2 All ER 
853, [1993] 1 WLR 909. [155] 
The conclusion on this matter was that the decision of the FIA in refusing to grant 
accreditation was not a public authority function and that therefore: 
… by virtue of s 6(3) and (5) of the Human Rights Act that a remedy would not in those 
circumstances be available against the FIA in respect of acts of that nature. [156] 
This issue in relation to the possibility of the availability of Judicial Review as a remedy has 
been addressed by several commentators, such as Kelly E., [157] Morris P, Oliver 
D., [158] and Little G., [159] Downward et al, [160] and Anderson J., who, when discussing 
the nature of the Jockey Club wrote: 
The Jockey Club, and a number of other leading sporting bodies, are not 'indisputably' 
private bodies. They regulate in a largely unfettered and monopolistic fashion an important 
aspect of national life and were it not for their existence it would be necessary for Parliament 
to create a public body (and only a public body would suffice) to perform their 
functions. [161] 
Furthermore as Anderson continues, The Horserace Betting Levy Board receives substantial 
sums from the betting levy. This money, in part contributes to the Jockey Club's "integrity 
unit" responsible for the fair administration of horseracing in the United Kingdom. The 
interest in combatting doping in sport in some respects is as much an issue around integrity 
in sport as illegal betting in horseracing. Where of course such actions differ is that 
invariably illegal betting is done to produce typically large financial gain for third parties 
whereas doping in sport is more often practised by individuals aiming for personal gain 
which may also benefit third parties. Nevertheless with the threat to the integrity of sport 
very real, note the recent allegations made suggesting Nation State wide doping 
conspiracy, [162] is it really sufficient to leave scrutiny of doping issues to simple contract, 
however closely such scrutiny may mirror that provided by judicial Review? 
Where the integrity of sport is threatened by suspicious betting patterns, the response of the 
authorities is very different to the response engendered by doping violations. One may 
question the reasons behind this when in some respects at least they have the same aim and 
the same result as can be seen from the quote below discussing the impact of betting and 
consequent match-fixing on sport: 
Eventually the credibility of results will be called into question. Sport is based on a hierarchy 
that derives its social and moral values from the concept of merit. The winner should be the 
one who has poured the most lawful resources into their preparation or who has worked the 
hardest. If in future the concept of a champion as a model of excellence becomes tarnished 
by the manipulation of matches or the corruption of players, then the entire credibility of 
sport will vanish. [163] 
This comment could very easily have been made about doping in sport rather than about the 
threat posed by betting and match-fixing but whereas the latter can give rise to criminal 
sanctions and a subsequent jail sentence, unless the transgressor is involved in smuggling 
and supply, the former will not. Perhaps it is time that sport viewed doping in the same vein 
that it views match-fixing? There are clear similarities between doping and match-fixing and 
whilst it is true that the practice of lay betting, (where bets are placed on individuals or 
teams to lose rather than win), has shifted the emphasis and penetration of corrupt betting, 
both nevertheless compromise what has been referred to as the "glorious uncertainty of 
sport". [164] It seems that there are battle lines being prepared to change this. Lord 
Moynihan has recently introduced a Bill into the House of Lords looking at the governance 
of sport. Amongst the provisions of this Bill is the intended criminalisation of doping in 
sport: 
(2) An athlete is guilty of an offence if he or she knowingly takes a prohibited substance with 
the intention, or one of the intentions, of enhancing his or her performance. 
(3) A person belonging to the entourage of an athlete is guilty of an offence if he or she 
encourages or assists or hides awareness of the relevant athlete taking a prohibited 
substance with the intention, or one of the intentions, of enhancing such athlete's 
performance. 
(4) Any person guilty of an offence under subsection (2) or (3) shall be liable- 
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding six months, or to both; or 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both. [165] 
Whilst this Bill is highly unlikely to be made law due to time pressure, [166] the intention as 
further explained by Lord Moynihan is to promote debate and discussion both within The 
Houses of Parliament and beyond. It is though perhaps indicative of the way thinking is 
now moving in this area. This is further evidenced by the situation emerging in Germany 
where there are also moves to make doping a crime, [167] a move that will affect foreign 
athletes competing in Germany as well as the 7000 or more in Germany's registered testing 
pool. This would then raise the spectre of an athlete being found guilty under the current 
regulations with the associated standard of proof, (that of the comfortable satisfaction) and 
suffering a two year or now four year ban under the new Code in front of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport and yet there being insufficient evidence to convict of a criminal act 
under Germany's new law. This is hardly a satisfactory state of affairs and will perhaps 
increase the sense of injustice that many feel about the imbalance of power which underpins 
the current anti-doping regime. [168] However, whilst the dogma of adherence to the reality 
of the contractual relationship remains, the standard is likely to remain some way short of 
beyond reasonable doubt which may afford athletes greater protection than that currently 
offered. It is though the case, as Korda v ITF Ltd [169] clearly confirms that a contract, (albeit 
at times perhaps a rather one sided contract), exists between sports participants and their 
governing bodies despite the fact that there may be no express agreement. Lightman J. 
affirms: 
There is no written agreement signed by the parties and there is no oral agreement either. 
Such an agreement is however plainly to be inferred… [170] 
Important factors which dictate the implication of the existence of a contract included in this 
instance Korda's knowledge of the existence of an anti-doping programme administered by 
the ITF, his provision of previous urine samples in support of the programme and his 
previous agreement to be bound by the programme when attempting to assert other 
rights. [171] Lightman J., goes on, 
Mr Flint for Mr Korda has submitted that his conduct is consistent with merely submitting 
to the jurisdiction of the AC rather than such as to establish in the circumstances the creation 
of a contractual relationship. This appears to me to be totally unreal. Any submission to the 
jurisdiction of the AC must in the circumstances be part of an acceptance of a contractual 
relationship on the terms of the Programme which defines the status, jurisdiction and 
procedures of the AC. [172] 
With that acceptance of a contract comes the implied acceptance of the standard 
of comfortable satisfaction as laid out in the doping regulations rather than that of beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
The applicability of the standard of comfortable satisfaction was explored in Collins v 
USADA. [173] It was subsequent to the adoption of the standard of comfortable satisfaction by 
the WADA in the first incarnation of the Code in 2003 that the International Amateur 
Athletic Federation, (IAAF), removed the requirement for securing proof beyond reasonable 
doubt when they amended their own rules which came into effect 1st March 2004. [174] 
Successive case law has helped to define what may amount to comfortable 
satisfaction, [175] and it is clear that the standard is very much dependent on the 
circumstances of each case and that the more serious the consequences then the higher this 
standard will be. [176] Of course the circumstances facing Lance Armstrong were arguably 
more serious than for any other "doping cheat" - the complete ruin of the reputation that he 
had so carefully constructed and protected throughout the course of his career, but more 
than that, his legend, his legacy and his charitable works. [177] All were threatened by the 
possibility of his exposure as a drug-cheat and this is why the case against him had to be 
flawless. The circumstances for Armstrong were toxic and to reach a standard of comfortable 
satisfaction, one would imagine would require very significant evidence. It is therefore 
disappointing that the USADA were not more careful with their charging letter and were 
never able to obtain anything more than circumstantial, (albeit potent), evidence. This 
evidence did include powerful testimony from former teammates such as George Hincapie 
and others [178] and numerous references to suspicious banking transactions, [179] but there 
was never the smoking gun of a conclusively failed test to damn Armstrong. 
It is clear that if greater care and attention had been devoted to policing cycling in the early 
days of Armstrong's career then the deceit may never have gone so far. It is arguable that the 
failings of cycling to construct a rigorous anti-doping regime indirectly created and then 
destroyed the Armstrong myth. But for their failings, he would never have had the success 
and so would not have been able to build his reputation which has subsequently been so 
dramatically deconstructed. The likelihood may have been that with an effective anti-doping 
regime, he would have been caught and punished and then returned to cycling all within a 
few years of his comeback from cancer, rather than being able to construct his legend only 
for it to ultimately be destroyed by the USADA. 
Armstrong of course has been stripped of all of his competitive results from 1st August 1998. 
This sanction runs far beyond the conventional statute of limitations as defined by Article 17 
of the WADA Code, which states: [180] 
No action may be commenced against an Athlete or other Person for a violation of an anti-
doping rule contained in the Code unless such action is commenced within eight years from 
the date of the violation occurring. [181] 
The question must therefore be posed as to why the USADA were able to ignore this very 
clear provision from the WADC. The first point that needs to be made is that the statute as 
laid out in the WADC is not absolute. Whilst this in itself is not necessarily a bad thing, its 
application nevertheless does draw some concerns as it raises the possibility of inconsistency, 
at least between different sports if not within sports. The CAS in ruling on the matter of the 
application of the statute of limitations has commented: 
interruption, suspension, expiry or extension of such [eight-year] time-bar … should be 
dealt with in the context of the principles of private law of the country where the interested 
sports authority is domiciled. [182] 
It is the case that this was merely an advisory opinion issued by the CAS but nevertheless 
the implications are clear - it is possible to disregard the provisions from Article 17 if the 
circumstances dictate. The relevant provisions at play here which enabled the USADA to go 
back much further than the conventional 8 years, (10 years under WADC 2015), enabled by 
the WADC revolved around Armstrong's behaviour in so vociferously protecting and 
propagating his image, his maintenance of the Armstrong myth. This had been built upon 
lies, fraud and even perjury, [183] and according to United States law, this dictated that the 
conventional statute of limitations could be dis-applied. One must distinguish in this 
instance between passive inaction by an athlete in not owning up to their doping past and 
the kind of concerted affirmative action taken by Armstrong over a long period of time to 
conceal his behaviour. [184] As the reasoned decision makes clear: 
Mr. Armstrong fraudulently concealed his doping from USADA in many ways, including 
lying under oath in the SCA case; lying in the 2000 French judicial investigation; 
intimidating witnesses; and soliciting false affidavits. Mr Armstrong cannot benefit from the 
running of a statute of limitation when a violation would have been asserted by USADA 
earlier but for his fraudulent concealment. [185] 
Whilst on the face of it this would appear to be a fairly logical state of affairs, the practical 
implications of the policy threaten to bring inconsistency to anti-doping policy. The CAS 
advisory opinion quoted above [186] makes it clear that these issues should be dealt with 
under the private law provisions of the country where the sports body is located. Whilst that 
should maintain consistency within sports it may mean that there will be issues between 
sports which may have their headquarters located in different places. The most obvious 
response to this is to make clear that as the CAS is domiciled in Switzerland then Swiss law 
should universally govern these issues, but it is not immediately apparent that this will 
happen. The danger of inconsistency creeping into anti-doping policy is something that 
needs to be considered if the policy, as stated by the reasoned decision is pursued. It is 
therefore unfortunate that Armstrong did not take his case to the CAS which was one of the 
safeguards to his rights under due process that the Court in Texas cited. [187] Similar 
provisions to those outlined above in the reasoned decision that allowed the USADA to 
override Article 17 exist in England and Wales under the Limitation Act 1980. Specifically s32 
states: 
Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake. 
(1) Subject to [F4subsection (3)][F4subsections (3) and (4A)] below, where in the case of any 
action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either- 
(a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or 
(b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action has been deliberately concealed from 
him by the defendant; or 
(c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; the period of limitation shall 
not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the 
case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. [188] 
The conventional limitation period for a simple contractual issue is one of six years. [189] It 
is possible to suggest that therefore this should be the limit contained within Article 17 
rather than the 8 years outlined in the WADC 2009 and the 10 years in WADC 2015. It has 
after all been made clear consistently that the relationship between a sports participant and 
their governing body is contractual. [190] Therefore it is legitimate to question the validity of 
the current 8 year limitation period contained in Article 17. Why should sports participants 
be compelled to submit to particular procedures due to essentially one sided "contractual" 
agreements when they are not able to exploit the very limited advantages that such a 
relationship may bring? It is pertinent to note that a compelling reason from their 
perspective for the USADA to bring their charges against Armstrong in the arbitration 
process was due to his agreement to submit to arbitration procedures in several of his 
International Cycling Licence applications. [191]This it was suggested amounted to a clear 
contractual agreement to submit to procedures of the choosing of the governing body and 
their acolytes. The advantages to Armstrong are arguably less clear. Whilst it must be 
acknowledged that the Appeal Court in Texas was satisfied that arbitration procedures were 
capable of protecting Armstrong's interests, commenting, as we have already seen that "the 
Court finds the USADA arbitration rules ... are sufficiently robust to satisfy ... due 
process", [192] it is nevertheless a fact that that the usual inevitable conclusion to a doping 
case taken before the CAS or indeed domestic tribunals is one where the individual athlete 
loses their case and therefore their livelihood. [193] 
Outwith such concerns however, there are clearly sound reasons for the suspension of any 
limitation period. Whether such sound reasons extend to those exhibited in the case in hand 
is more contentious. If we examine the wording of the Limitation Act 1980, it is clear that the 
limitation period can be postponed where there has been fraud or concealment. Further, it is 
clear that the actions of Lance Armstrong, over an extended period of time, fit squarely 
within these parameters. What is more difficult to reconcile though is the second limb of the 
equation which states, (to reiterate): 
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, 
concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have 
discovered it. [194] 
The "discovery" of Armstrong's fraud has been well documented in the reasoned decision and 
contains the ammunition necessary for postponing the running of the limitation period 
detailed in Article 17 of the WADC. That however should not necessarily be the end of the 
matter. One has to question when his concealment should have been discovered. With 
reasonable diligence, could his fraud have been discovered much earlier? Black's Law 
Dictionary defines reasonable diligence thus: 
A fair, proper, and due degree of care and activity, measured with reference to the particular 
circumstances; such diligence, care, or attention as might be expected from a man of 
ordinary prudence and activity. [195] 
The circumstances of each scenario are thus of critical importance in assessing 
whether reasonable diligence has been followed. Could the USADA and/or the UCI have 
discovered Armstrong's fraud much earlier than they eventually did so? If the answer to this 
question is affirmative then this must surely prevent them from postponing the limitation 
period contained in Article 17. If we turn to examine the 
particular circumstances surrounding Lance Armstrong, it seems surprising that his actions 
were not "discovered" far earlier, especially given the signs outlined earlier in this article. 
The simple answer appears to be that no one was looking particularly carefully. It may be 
suggested that there was a culture of denial amongst those intimately involved in the 
safeguarding of their sport which seemed to run even as Armstrong was about to be 
unmasked. Leading anti-doping expert Dr Michael Ashenden [196] writing after 
Armstrong's unmasking commented: 
If the UCI failed to examine Armstrong's raw data when he placed third at the 2009 Tour de 
France, the UCI were derelict in their obligations to faithfully run the passport on behalf of 
the riders, teams and race organizers who contribute 85 percent of the costs of running the 
passport program. [197] Those stakeholders deserve to know that their program is being run 
by competent and diligent managers. [198] 
He continued: 
If, on the other hand, the UCI did examine Armstrong's raw data but failed to recognize that 
flat line blood values in tandem with suppressed bone marrow activity in the third place 
getter of a major tour was consistent with the possible use of blood transfusion, they have 
proven themselves to be biologically illiterate. This immediately puts into question the 
veracity of the UCI's repeated statements that their interpretation of the peloton's blood 
values indicates a decrease in the extent of doping since 2008. There could be 50 cyclists 
doping like Armstrong and the biologically blind UCI could be completely unaware of their 
existence. [199] 
One possible explanation for this apparent lack of due diligence in pursuing Armstrong may 
lie in a conflict of interests that was again highlighted by Ashenden: 
The fact that the UCI demanded $100,000 from Armstrong, and later failed to share his 
suspicious blood results with their expert panel, is a damning pair of facts that must be 
scrutinized by an independent agency, … Because Armstrong's blood results were also 
accessed by the Lausanne laboratory, who were given a free analyzer paid for by Armstrong, 
their involvement in this highly questionable scenario must also be included in a forensic 
scrutiny of the triangular relationship between the laboratory, Armstrong and the UCI. [200] 
There may be a simpler answer of course which perhaps has more to do with sheer stubborn 
refusal to accept the inevitable, an attitude built upon foundations of familiarity and 
friendship nurtured by Armstrong with the great and good of world cycling, epitomised in 
particular by his relationship with Hein Verbruggen, [201] who in the aftermath of the 
damning broadcast by Tyler Hamilton in 2011 on CBS television, [202] in which several 
allegations were made against Armstrong, protested: 
That's impossible, because there is nothing. I repeat again: Lance Armstrong has never used 
doping. Never, never, never. And I say this not because I am a friend of his, because that is 
not true. I say it because I'm sure. [203] 
It was of course just a short while later that the Armstrong myth finally evaporated and he 
was revealed to everyone as a serial doping cheat. Hindsight is a seductive mistress but it 
seems inconceivable that more could not have been done to unravel any fraud or 
misrepresentation on the part of Armstrong and perhaps therefore questions the 
disregarding of the limitation period as outlined in Article 17 of the WADC. 
Armstrong is currently serving a lifetime ban [204] from cycling imposed by USADA and 
the UCI in the wake of the reasoned decision. Cycling continues to suffer from innuendo with 
each subsequent winner of the Tour de France inevitably having to face a barrage of 
questions linked to the Armstrong era. [205] Each seeks redemption or at least, (in 
Armstrong's case), release from the finality of his ban, whilst cycling has instigated its 
Independent Commission [206] , to which Armstrong himself has given evidence. [207] He 
has recently begun what some may see as a charm offensive, [208] which has included his 
first television interview [209] since the confessional he gave to Oprah Winfrey in January 
2013. Armstrong's suggestion is that he merely seeks equity with other convicted drugs 
cheats, insisting that he is being treated more harshly due to his high profile and notoriety. 
Roan reports: 
Over his seven-year reign at the Tour between 1999 and 2005, an incredible 87% of the top-
10 finishers were confirmed dopers, or suspected of doping. 
It is on this basis Armstrong believes he has been harshly treated, with other dopers given 
shorter bans, and keeping their titles while he lost his. [210] 
The former President of the UCI [211] has gone on record as stating that Armstrong has in 
part been made a scapegoat for the sins of cycling and has indeed been treated more harshly 
than others. [212] A reduction in the length of his ban for Armstrong in the light of his 
discussions with the Commission may be edging closer. It would though undoubtedly be 
opposed by many from within and outside the sport who might suggest that cycling itself 
has not yet atoned for its systematic complicity with the doping regime prevalent in the 
sport for many years. Cycling simply cannot erase its past in the way that it has erased 
Armstrong's seven Tour de France titles. To further the Commission's investigations it may 
be appropriate to consider some kind of limited amnesty for those who choose to cooperate 
with the investigation. This path though has some difficulties which will now be briefly 
explored. 
4. AN AMNESTY 
It has been mooted that a possible way forward for cycling is to implement an amnesty in 
order to purge the sport of its previous wrongdoings. This would be a far-reaching move 
and may be pursued as a specific measure to cycling, in part at least to encourage witnesses 
to come forward, [213] or a more generic amnesty, the scope of which remains 
unclear. [214] Whilst perhaps this may be an interesting idea, one must question whether 
such a course of action would be appropriate for cycling to take and whether there is legal 
justification for it? 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines amnesty thus: 
• An official pardon for people who have been convicted of political offences. 
• An undertaking by the authorities to take no action against specified offences or offenders 
during a fixed period. [215] 
The desire for an amnesty is seductive. It may avoid many years of difficult and explosive 
prosecutions and it could also promote reconciliation and a building of trust between the 
cyclists, the governing body and the anti-doping organisations. Such a move though would 
almost be unprecedented in sport. [216] We are perhaps familiar with them in a political 
context, most notably of course in South Africa following the dismantling of 
apartheid. [217] But for sport and particularly for a provision as thorny and apparently as 
widespread as doping it would be a problematic proposal. Whilst there is no provision for 
such a measure contained within the WADC, [218] with consensus from key stakeholders 
such as the UCI, the WADA and the International Olympic Committee some form of pardon 
or plea-bargaining approach may be possible. Article 10.6.1.1 states in part: 
The extent to which the otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility may be suspended shall 
be based on the seriousness of the anti-doping rule violation committed by the Athlete or 
other Person and the significance of the Substantial Assistance provided by the Athlete or 
other Person to the effort to eliminate doping in sport. No more than three-quarters of the 
otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility may be suspended. If the otherwise applicable 
period of Ineligibility is a lifetime, the non-suspended period under this section must be no 
less than eight years. [219] 
The WADC goes further in encouraging cooperation and in endeavouring to promote this 
kind of approach, and article 10.6 of WADC 2015, provides for reduced or removed 
ineligibility in circumstances where the accused provides substantial assistance in the anti-
doping investigation. This approach however is still some way short of any kind of amnesty. 
With this approach the threat of murky backroom deals looms large and is enabled by 
further provision in the Code which goes on: 
In unique circumstances where WADA determines that it would be in the best interest of 
anti-doping, WADA may authorize an Anti-Doping Organization to enter into appropriate 
confidentiality agreements limiting or delaying the disclosure of the Substantial Assistance 
agreement or the nature of Substantial Assistance being provided. [220] 
Whilst the provision of such confidentiality agreements displays a pragmatic and common-
sense approach to the circumstances under which an athlete may be in a position to offer 
such substantial assistance, caution must nevertheless be the watchword. The governance and 
practice of sport is littered with allegations of corruption, as the ongoing allegations 
involving FIFA, the International Amateur Athletic Federation, (IAAF) and now the 
Association of Tennis Professionals, (ATP), [221] all indicate. Past history in cycling also 
suggests that where it may be judicious to maintain an omerta then extreme measures may 
be taken to protect those who might be central or at least complicit in such an approach. 
With this provision now contained in the new code there is a real danger that justice will not 
be seen to be done and even where a silence has been maintained for sound, genuine 
reasons the suspicion may linger that foul practice is being pursued by a sport for its own 
particular means. [222] There is a danger that in the rush to expose a wider ring of drug 
cheats, the impetus will be lost in dealing with the individual. [223] 
In relation to any possible amnesty, it may be difficult to justify directing it towards any one 
particular sport such as cycling. It would be a particular challenge to justify applying an 
amnesty to cycling for example but not to other sports which may be considered to have a 
doping problem. [224] It would almost certainly need to be some kind of generic amnesty 
administered by the WADA. [225] Such a precedent would be dangerous in that it would be 
rewarding, (or at least ignoring), previous corrupt behaviour and would arguably increase 
future motivation by individuals to engage in doping practices if they thought they may be 
subject to a future amnesty. The very financial future of the sport may be put at risk by such 
a move as it would appear at least possible that many mainstream sponsors might desert 
rather than continue to be associated with a sport where such a measure was considered to 
be the only way forward. Such an event has again recently been highlighted in relation to 
the IAAF which seems likely to lose the sponsorship of Adidas in the wake of the doping 
scandal which has engulfed the organisation. [226] Further complications may arise in 
countries where doping in sport is a criminal offence and therefore there would need to be 
consultation and agreement with state prosecutors if such a policy was to be pursued. 
There is a clear tension between on the one hand the possibility of secrecy, or some form of 
information blackout being erected around those rendering substantial assistance as outlined 
in Article 10.6.1.3 and the guidance issued on amnesties in a political context by the Inter-
American Commission which in 1992 looked into the issue of amnesties relating to criminal 
acts in Argentina, El Salvador and Uruguay. Cassel comments on the work of that 
Commission: 
It offered two guidelines for nations grappling with the problem. First, only amnesties 
enacted by democratically elected bodies, not self-amnesties by the abusive regime itself, 
have legal validity. Second, even democratically enacted amnesties must respect the need to 
investigate, because both society and the families of victims have the right to know the 
truth. [227] 
There is certainly an argument that might suggest that the UCI could be portrayed as the 
abusive regime central to the doping scandals in cycling over the years, [228] and it is also 
the case that truth and reconciliation commissions would invariably have open truth as a 
pre-requisite of any amnesty but it is perhaps taking the right to truth a step too far to 
suggest that this kind of right might apply to doping in sport. These are not after-all gross 
human rights violations for which a right to truth must be justified to bring reconciliation 
and closure to victims and family and friends of victims. They are rather merely instances of 
sporting fraud and breach of contract so any attempt to invoke a "right to truth" would be 
unlikely to be fruitful. However, whilst this avenue may not produce any positive response 
in the event of secrecy being invoked bysubstantial assistance, there may be another avenue 
that may enable light to be shone. 
5. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 
This avenue may lie in the United Kingdom within The Freedom of Information Act 2000, (FOI), 
which grants a general right to information from public authorities to anyone requesting 
such information. [229] Schedule 1 of the legislation lists the designated Public 
Authorities subject to the FOI and UK Sport is one of those listed and therefore is subject to 
the UK FOI, [230] and they publish details of their obligations under the legislation on their 
website. [231] Similarly and perhaps more pertinently UK Anti-Doping, (UKAD), is also 
subject to the legislation. [232] It is well known however that sports governing bodies being 
private entities are not subject to Judicial Review, [233] and nor are they subject to the FOI 
Act [234] per se , albeit there has been some pressure for this position to be reassessed. For 
example the Football Supporters Federation has actively campaigned for the Football 
Association to be brought within the remit of the legislation. [235] Whilst not currently listed 
in Schedule 1 as being subject to the FOI, there is nevertheless provision within the 
legislation for further designation of public authorities. Section 5 states: 
5 Further power to designate public authorities. 
(1)The [F1Secretary of State] may by order designate as a public authority for the purposes 
of this Act any person who is neither listed in Schedule 1 nor capable of being added to that 
Schedule by an order under section 4(1), but who- . 
(a) appears to the Secretary of State to exercise functions of a public nature, or . 
(b) is providing under a contract made with a public authority any service whose provision 
is a function of that authority. [236] 
The door therefore is left open for the reclassification of certain governing bodies to be 
brought within the remit of the FOI. With the temptation to ignore or overlook 
transgressions that may portray their sports in an unfavourable light, something is perhaps 
needed to "encourage" those that run sports to embark on a policy of greater disclosure 
around doping and other issues related to corruption. The best route to achieve this aim may 
ultimately lie in the application of the FOI. Whilst such a move may be unlikely at present, if 
UK Sport, however, were to hold any information regarding the areas of concern expressed 
above concerning the application of article 10.6.1.3, [237]then this could be subject to an FOI 
request which may raise some interesting issues which might otherwise have remained 
shrouded. 
The power of the FOI to shine a light into anti-doping provision was illustrated in a decision 
by the Information Commissioners Office in an appeal in July 2013 following the refusal of 
UKAD to disclose information pertaining to details of drug tests which had been carried out 
on competitive British Olympic weightlifters over a 24 month period.[238] UKAD had 
attempted to refuse to release the information under either section s36(2)(c) as being conduct 
which would likely prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs or s40(2) as being 
information of a personal nature the disclosure of which may violate the Data Protection 
Act. [239] Under the first limb of s36(2), UKAD were successful in arguing that disclosure 
would prejudice the administration of an effective anti-doping programme. The 
Commissioner stated: 
the disputed information would be likely to assist athletes, support personnel or other 
relevant parties in making deductions about the public authority's testing programme in 
relation to weightlifting. It is conceivable that those deductions could assist athletes so 
inclined to plan their doping activities accordingly to avoid detection. The Commissioner 
therefore accepts that the likelihood of prejudice to the ability of the public authority to 
conduct effective testing on competitive British weightlifters in the event of disclosure is real 
and significant. [240] 
However, there is also a public interest requirement to be satisfied under s36(2)(c) and it was 
here that UKAD failed to convince the Commissioner that disclosure would prejudice the 
relationships between UKAD, governing bodies and other related personnel and influence 
them to curtail cooperation with UKAD in the anti-doping regime. The Commissioner made 
the point that there was a serious reputational risk to any governing body which refused to 
cooperate and any athlete faced the possibility of sporting sanctions if they withdrew their 
cooperation. [241] UKAD was also unsuccessful under s40(2) of the legislation relating to 
personal information, and the information was released. The Commissioner commented: 
Athletes generally expect that details of their test results could be made public as part of 
measures to prevent doping and/or to reassure the public that a competition was free of 
doping or that a particular sport is subject to rigorous anti-doping measures. In the 
circumstances of this case where there is already a clear precedent for similar disclosures by 
the international governing body for weightlifting, the Commissioner is of the view that the 
athletes would have been under no illusion when they provided samples for testing that 
details of the tests could be made public. Given the athletes' expectations in relation to drug 
testing, the Commissioner is satisfied that disclosure would not constitute a significant 
intrusion on their private lives. As mentioned, the public authority had also revealed that 
British Olympians were tested at least once in the run up to London 2012. [242] 
In concluding, the Commissioner reported that, "He is satisfied that in the circumstances, 
disclosure was necessary to meet the legitimate public interest in 
transparency".[243] Essentially therefore it can be seen that it is the public interest argument 
that made sure this particular information was released. Arguably though in relation to this 
case, the continuing argument around possible non-disclosure in order to maintain, and the 
at-least-arguable public interest in maintaining a properly functioning anti-doping regime 
was won by UKAD; and it remains to be seen if the same public interest arguments would 
still hold sway with the new WADA Code in place, which now specifically references the 
need under certain circumstances to maintain secrecy. 
It is the case however that the WADC 2015 explicitly references material disclosure of details 
of athletes' tests. Article 14.4 of the Code states: 
Anti-Doping Organizations shall, at least annually, publish publicly a general statistical 
report of their Doping Control activities, with a copy provided to WADA. Anti-Doping 
Organizations may also publish reports showing the name of each Athlete tested and the 
date of each Testing. (emphasis added). [244] 
It is certainly the case that the point made by the Commissioner above that athletes expect 
their details to be made public would no-longer be true due to the presence of the new 
article 10.6.1.3 and therefore this may lead to greater likelihood that the Commissioner 
would rule against disclosure in any future case. The ideal position can perhaps be best 
summed up in the Decision Notice concerning UKAD (referenced above): 
A body funded with public money must be transparent. The public authority cannot expect 
the public to consider it beyond reproach simply because it says it is, it has to prove it. Its 
actions must be open to media and public examination. It is only through such transparency 
that procedures can be reviewed, suggestions made and protocols improved. The argument 
that disclosure could allow unscrupulous individuals to determine a 'testing pattern' is 
exactly the kind of reason why the disputed information should be disclosed so that any 
shortcoming in the system can be identified. If predictable test patterns exist, then the 
system is already flawed. If there is nothing in the testing protocol which would cause 
embarrassment then there is no reason not to disclose the disputed information.[245] 
With the recent problems that have emerged in relation to the UCI and the IAAF with 
regards to doping and with FIFA [246] and the ATP, [247] with other forms of corruption, 
the call for greater transparency in sports governance is likely to increase. It can already be 
seen that there have been moves to compromise the traditional independent pyramid nature 
of sports governance and decision making, which highlights: 
An increasing number of people want to be involved in sport at all levels and in different 
capacities. This has led to more interest and intervention from national governments in 
sporting matters and the activities of sports bodies including verification of whether sports 
bodies are fit for public funding. [248] 
Without fit and proper governance, then there is a clear danger that we will see more of the 
kinds of scandals referenced above that have recently come to light in football, athletics, 
tennis and cycling. It is arguable that measures empowered by the FOI 2000 and seen to 
operate in the Decision Notice involving UK Anti-Doping, [249] may enable a degree of 
scrutiny that may satisfy those seeking to compromise the hierarchy of decision making in 
sports governing bodies. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Armstrong's reluctance to challenge the USADA has denied the sporting world the 
opportunity to hear all sides of this case. His acceptance of defeat to Travis Tygart and the 
USADA suggests that all of the allegations contained within the reasoned decision are true 
which in itself is not surprising and therefore perhaps is not the main issue that those who 
are interested in drug free sport should be concerned about. Of far more importance is the 
action, (or inaction) of the UCI during Armstrong's long reign at the summit of world 
cycling and the apparent conflict between the UCI and the USADA, both of whom were 
seemingly working to the same aim, (that of a drug free sport). These conflicts were summed 
up in Armstrong v Tygart where District Judge Sparkes commented: 
there are troubling aspects of this case, not least of which is USADA's apparent single-
minded determination to force Armstrong to arbitrate the charges against him, in direct 
conflict with UCI's equally evident desire not to proceed against him. Unfortunately, the 
appearance of conflict on the part of both organizations creates doubt the charges against 
Armstrong would receive fair consideration in either forum. [250] 
There are many questions that need to be answered, (just a few of which have been 
considered in this paper) and the danger now is that these will be left, perhaps only to be 
considered at a much later date. The puzzling response of the UCI has perhaps best been 
summed up by Dr Michael Ashenden referenced earlier. [251] 
It is interesting to consider this case in the context of whether something similar is more or 
less likely to occur in the future in the United Kingdom. Would or should governing bodies 
face greater scrutiny and accountability for their actions? Should this scrutiny come via 
judicial review? It is apparent that unless there is a fundamental shift then this particular 
avenue is out of the question. Successive case law has made this abundantly clear however 
desirable it may be, [252] and it is unlikely to change, irrespective of whether or not such 
scrutiny may make a massive sporting fraud on a par with Armstrong less likely. Where 
there may be an avenue for an elevated level of scrutiny around the practice of the UCI or 
any other governing body may lie in an examination of the Freedom of Information Act. 
Whilst there is the requirement in this instance for there to be someone interested in 
obtaining the information and that therefore it is more likely to be a detection rather than 
prevention tool, there is certainly an argument to put forward that the potential availability 
of information under the legislation means that it is more likely that the sporting 
organisations will be disposed to follow rigorous process in their implementation of anti-
doping policy and programmes. It is just possible that the threat of the exposure of poor 
practice under something similar to the FOI might have meant that the UCI would have 
sharpened up their act and pursued the cause of a drug free sport with rather more rigour 
than appears to have been the case with Lance Armstrong. 
Where though does this leave cycling? There is a clear lack of trust between the anti-doping 
authorities and the governing body which threatens to derail any measures or initiatives 
that may be suggested.[253] 
These are difficult times for cycling but they have been the authors of their own downfall, 
from the actions of the participants to more seriously the behaviour of those that are charged 
with running and safeguarding their sport. It is to those individuals that the spotlight now 
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